Donbas Interviews, Part I: “A small number of die-hards on both sides”
How likely is it that the conflict will resume? "It is a near-certainty."
Read Part II, Part III, Part IV, and Part V.
The conflict between Ukrainian government forces and pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine is one of the most controversial and misunderstood low-intensity wars going on in the world today. To the Ukrainian government, it's an anti-terrorist operation against militias backed by an expansionist Russia seeking to restore former glory. To the separatists, it's a fight for freedom from a Western puppet government whose hostility towards its ethnic Russian citizens became intolerable. To millions of Russians and Ukrainians, it's an ongoing tragedy, where people with similar languages and cultures kill one another with no discernable end goal.
We are conducting a series of interviews with people who have experienced the conflict in some way – both those who back one side and those who simply wish for a peaceful resolution.
The subject of this interview is Mike Omelchenko, an anti-war activist.
How likely is it that the conflict will resume?
It is a near-certainty. In 2018, the Ukrainian government ended the anti-terrorist operation in the east and created a joint forces operation for the reintegration of the Donbas. The military general staff and ministry of defense are now responsible for all issues relating to the Donbas, rather than the interior ministry. Presumably that was not for a peaceful solution to the Donbas question.
Does the Ukrainian government have enough initiative and Western support to retake the Donbas?
The US establishment is fanatically hostile to Russia due to her aspirations for great power status, as well as fabricated incidents. As a result, Ukraine will enjoy substantial Western support in the reconquest of Donbas. War is always uncertain, so it is difficult to predict the outcome of the war.
On one hand, pro-Russian members of the military and security forces have been removed or demoted. The disastrous mutinies of 2014 won't be repeated. On the other hand, the Russians have reorganized their forces on their western border. As a much stronger, more populous, and wealthier country, she could easily overrun Ukraine if she commits her full forces. However, it is doubtful that she will. International pressure will allow for only a limited campaign at most, and a Russian conquest of "New Russia"* isn't worth the economic sanctions that she would suffer.
*Novorossiya, or New Russia, is one of several historical terms for the Donbas region.
Is formally recognizing or even annexing the Donbas in the Russian government’s interest? What will relations between the Russian Federation and the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk republics look like in the near future?
Annexations and military conquests were worthwhile in pre-industrial times, when wealth was found in agriculture and livestock. In modern times, development and its prerequisite, stability, are far more important. The Russians would be much better off if they returned the Donbas to Ukraine and resumed normal relations.
However, the fanatical hostility that the US government shows to Russia is unlikely to abate even if Russia returned the Donbas to Ukraine, due to domestic issues in the US. This changes calculations for the Russian government – the path of wisdom for them is no longer to be an ordinary international partner, but to be an independent power that can resist the pressure of others.
In the West, some on the political right sympathize with Ukrainian nationalism, comparing it to other European right-wing movements. Is this perspective accurate?
Nationalisms across the world share some similarities, but are never exact equivalents. In general, they prefer a large middle class of proprietors in a national bourgeoisie to be the core of society. This is in opposition to the oligarchical-NGO societies that predominate in the so-called free world. While the national-bourgeois model is indeed what most Ukrainian nationalists would support, in practice the poverty of the country prevents movement towards it.
For now, nationalist movements are funded by oligarchs hoping to use them as muscle against their competitors – a situation very different from anywhere in the West, where anarchists and the like usually fill that role. As a result, the Ukrainian nationalists are both uniquely privileged and uniquely disadvantaged compared to Western nationalists.
I imagine most Western nationalists envy them regardless. The opportunity to openly organize and participate in government outweighs the superior wealth of the Western organizations.
On the other hand, some on the political right sympathize with Russia, viewing it as a holdout of conservative values similar to other Eastern European nations. Is this perspective accurate?
Russians have a different set of worldviews than Westerners, so their positions that appear conservative to outsiders are often orthogonal to any Western concern. Abortion, for instance, is far more common in Russia than in the United States, and is related to equity feminism (as opposed to Western identity feminism) and anti-Islamic acts are based on immediate threats to the Russian state from Caucasian separatists, not anti-immigration sentiment.
Is there anything else you would tell Western audiences to improve their understanding of the conflict?
Ukrainian-Russian enmity is mostly at the government level. At the individual level, most Ukrainians and Russians still get along fine, and regularly marry. Most of the fighting in the Donbas was done by a small number of diehards on both sides.
Interview lightly edited for clarity.